Implementation of Rural Electrification Scheme
– RGGVY, in Uttar Pradesh

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Abstract
Based on a survey of more than 2000 villages,
in this paper, an attempt has been made to point out the
defects and shortcomings in the high voltage distribution
system (HVDS) installations built under the Rajeev
Gandhi Gramin Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) of rural
electrification. Avoiding these could have made the
installations much better. Also, it could have been costeffective
and could have resulted in earlier completion of
the project.
I. INTRODUCTION
AJEEV Gandhi Gramin Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY)
is an ambitious scheme of Government of India for rural
electrification. Rural Electrification Corporation (REC) was
the nodal agency for the scheme. The scheme adopted high
voltage distribution system (HVDS) for electrifying the
villages. In the system, 11 kV, high voltage overhead lines
were built and 10 or 16 kVA, 11/0.230 kV, single phase pole
mounted transformers were used. In some districts, 25 kVA,
11/0.4 kV, 3 phase, double pole mounted transformers were
also installed. Consumers were supplied through air-bunched
cables from the distribution boxes, installed along with these
transformers.
In this paper, an attempt has been made to point out defects
and shortcomings in the installations built under the scheme.
Some of these are inherent in the technical specifications
prepared by the distribution companies while others are made
during the execution of work which could have been
completely avoided. Factors causing these are also
investigated.
Observations made in the paper, are based on inspection of
more than 2000 villages electrified under the scheme. These
inspection were performed during the period from August,
2006 to August, 2009.
II. FACTORS AFFECTING THE QUALITY OF WORK
For the execution of project, contracts were given mainly to
big names in Indian electrical industry. Aim of involving
working agencies other than the distribution companies, was
to ensure the good quality of work. However, the aim was
only partially achieved. Factors affecting the quality of work
are as follows:
Assistant Director (Electrical Safety), Government of U.P., Basti Zone, Basti -
272 001 (e-mail: aksahani43[at]gmail.com).
A. Lack of proper supervision:
The working agencies did not have prior experience in rural
electrification work. Also, they did not have necessary human
resources. Most of the companies relied on the retired
personnel of the state electricity boards/corporations and these
people could not change their working habits as per the
requirement of the scheme. Even the agencies were somewhat
negligent about the execution part as their priority was the
supply of materials which was more profit making.
At next stage, at district level, the working agencies employed
local contractors. They were given village-wise contract for
execution of work. Initially, there were not enough
contractors but the amount involved in the scheme attracted
civil contractors, local public representatives, small
politicians, etc. Though these contractors did not have any
experience in this field, they used all means to get the
contract for maximum number of villages. Some of these
contractors employed sub- contractors to carry out the work,
obviously at lower rates.
At last stage, there were not enough labours to carry out the
work simultaneously in all districts of the state. Only the
labours working for the contractors of state electricity boards/
corporations were available. Due to high demand, many
unskilled labours were also involved. These labours changed
the contractors very frequently with increase in their wages.
So finally the labours working for the state electricity boards/
corporations with unskilled ones were to execute the work,
the contractors were not capable of supervising and the
working agencies had the persons cultured in the state
electricity boards/ corporations or inexperienced ones for
supervision. Thus, there was nothing to expect improvement
in the quality of work
B. Negligence by distribution companies:
For each district, the working agency got the survey done,
prepared the line diagram and got it approved by the
distribution companies. But though the installations were
finally to be taken over by the distribution companies, up to
assistant engineer’s level, there was no involvement of
employees of these companies at the planning or execution
level of the project. Its consequences were two fold. First, the
contractor faced lot of difficulties in erecting the poles and
providing the stays. Contractor and the working agency had
to tackle the objections, raised by land owners, on their own
and the supplier was not of any help in selecting proper right
of way for overhead lines. These improperly located poles and
Implementation of Rural Electrification Scheme
– RGGVY, in Uttar Pradesh
A.K. Sahani
R
16th NATIONAL POWER SYSTEMS CONFERENCE, 15th-17th DECEMBER, 2010 567
Department of Electrical Engineering, Univ. College of Engg., Osmania University, Hyderabad, A.P, INDIA.
stays had resulted in frequent road accidents, causing damage
to the installations. On the other hand, contractors enjoyed
freedom in erecting the poles and providing the stays. After
erecting the poles and providing the stays at their will, the
contractor gave the executed line diagram and the agency got
it again approved. Thus, there was no meaning of prior
approval of line diagram as there was no one to look after its
execution. Clearly, no effort was made to make the
installation cost-effective. Contractors erected maximum
number of poles and built unnecessarily lengthy overhead
lines. There are examples of constructing parallel lines for
different villages on both sides of roads, tapping from a much
distant pole of existing line, constructing long sections of
overhead lines and not providing transformers at the end of
these, etc. This misuse of fund could have been stopped by
active involvement of distribution companies at planning and
execution levels.
C. Non-completion of Work:
Erection of poles, providing stays, stringing of conductors and
mounting of transformers do not need much skill and are
most profit making. After completing these work, contractors
got payment up to 70% of the bill. Also, as materials were
used unrestrictedly, much of the materials were left with
them. These contractors never turned up to complete the
work. Later, agencies were to employ other contractors or
their own teams to complete the work such as guarding and
earthing. In this way, the completion of work was delayed and
involvement of different groups resulted in defects of different
nature.
D. Poor Quality of Materials:
Materials were supplied by the working agencies and their
quality was to be ensured by the distribution companies.
Though specific investigation in this regard was not done but
compromise with quality was observed in following
materials-
1) Poles:
8.5 and 9.0 metre PCC poles were used in the project.
Demand of large number of these poles arose with the
commencement of execution of the scheme. Units producing
such poles were not able to meet the demand. Many new units
were established especially for the project. Compromise with
quality of these poles is readily observed. Poles were supplied
with improper curing. As a result, appreciable bending of
poles was very common. Also, it caused breakage of large
number of poles during transportation and handling.
2) Galvanised materials:
Rusting of galvanized materials such as GI wires, stay wires
and metallic fittings was seen in some of the districts.
Clearly, galvanization of these was not proper.
3) Danger boards:
Danger boards, used by one of the major working agencies,
were faded and their printing was unrecognizable. Use of
such danger boards was useless.
4) Under-gauge wire:
One of the working agencies supplied thinner GI wire for 8
SWG, GI wire and resisted much before replacing it.
5) Improper length of electrodes:
In some villages pieces of electrodes were used for earthing.
III. DEFECTS AND SHORTCOMINGS IN INSTALLATIONS
To energize a high voltage installation, rule 63 of Indian
Electricity Rules, 1956 necessitates approval in writing by the
electrical inspector. During this inspection, it was found that
the factors discussed above – lack of proper supervision at
contractor’s or agency’s level, involvement of unskilled
labours, negligence by distribution companies, contractor’s
motive to maximize the profit and their habit to leave the
work incomplete, and supply of inferior quality of materials,
had resulted in the technical defects and shortcomings in the
installations built under the scheme. Some of these are
inherent in the technical specifications prepared by the
distribution companies and others are made while executing
the work.
A. Defects and Shortcomings Inherent in Technical
Specifications:
There was no uniformity in the technical specifications
prepared by the different distribution companies. Also, these
were not same for the different districts under the same
distribution company. These specifications violate some of the
provisions of Indian Electricity Rules, 1956. These are as
follows- (rules quoted hereafter are those of Indian Electricity
Rules, 1956.)
1) Earthing of neutral terminal:
Rule 67(1A)(a) provides for the earthing of neutral terminal
of transformer by not less than two separate and distinct
connections. Whereas, in the project single earthing of
neutral terminal by 8 or 6 SWG GI wire was provided.
2) Earthing of metallic parts:
Rule 67(1) read with 67(6) and 61 provides for the earthing of
frames of transformer and distribution box, respectively, by
not less than two separate and distinct connections. Whereas,
only single earthing of the metallic parts by 8 or 6 SWG, GI
wire was provided in the scheme.
3) Earthing of surge arresters:
According to rule 92(2) the earthing lead for any lightning
arrester shall not pass through any iron or steel pipe, but
shall be taken as directly as possible from the lightning
arrester to a separate earth electrode and/or junction of the
earth mat already provided for the high and extra high
voltage sub-station subject to the avoidance of bends
wherever practicable. Also, a vertical ground electrode shall
be connected to this junction of the earth mat. For the surge
arresters, GI strips of suitable dimensions should have been
used for earthing but in the scheme 8 or 6 SWG, GI wire
wound on the pole, with other earth-wires, was used. Thus,
neither the thickness of the earth wire was appropriate nor
any consideration was given to avoid bends in it.
B. Defects and Shortcomings Caused During the
Work:
Defects and shortcomings of installations made during the
execution of work are of various nature. Frequent ones are as
follows:
16th NATIONAL POWER SYSTEMS CONFERENCE, 15th-17th DECEMBER, 2010 568
Department of Electrical Engineering, Univ. College of Engg., Osmania University, Hyderabad, A.P, INDIA.
1) Improper grouting of supports and stays:
In RGGVY, 8.5 metre PCC poles were used as supports for
11kV overhead lines. However, some of the working agencies
had employed 9.0 metre PCC poles for 11/0.230 kV
substations. Grouting of each support was to be done.
Dimensions for grouting as per the Rural Electrification &
Secondary System Planning Organisation, Lucknow (RESPO)
standard [1] are 450 mm×450 mm×1500 mm. The working
agencies paid such good rate for grouting of supports and
stays that some contractors engaged sub-contractors, at 25%
to 40% lower rates, to do the work. In this way, these
contractors earned a profit of 25% to 40% of the amount paid
for grouting of supports and stays, without doing any work.
The contractors / sub-contractors resorted to all unfair means
such as doing grouting for a depth of 300mm or so, using
sub-standard material for grouting or not doing grouting at
all, etc., for making profit. As there was no handy way to
verify the depth and quality of grouting and the working
agencies were not cooperating for it, the verification was very
difficult and time consuming. Anticipating these difficulties
in verification, the grouting was not done properly and the
amount spent for this purpose was largely pilfered.
Technically, if stays were not properly tightened, it would
have been better to erect the poles without grouting. Once the
pole is grouted, any bending moment acting on it localises at
the ground level, i.e., from where the grouting starts, and that
results in appreciable permanent bending of poles.
2) Improper mounting of F-clamps:
In a significant number of PCC poles, holes provided on the
top for fixing F-clamp were not matching those of the clamps.
In this case, the F-clamp was mounted by clamping it with
pole using D-clamps. The F-clamps mounted so were free to
incline either side laterally. It would have been better to weld
the F-clamp with a D-clamp before mounting it in such a
way.
3) Improper right-of-way for overhead lines:
Proper right-of-way for overhead lines was not selected. At
some places, pin insulators were found mounted on the trees
to provide clearance from them.
4) Improper anti-climbing device:
For anti-climbing device barbed wire is to be wound for a
length of 900 mm with a pitch of 15 mm [1]. But the anticlimbing
devices used by the working agencies were usually
found improper. The barbed wire was wound for insufficient
length and inter-turn spacing was also not appropriate for its
purpose.
5) Improper / no contact of earth wire with metallic fittings:
Rule 90(1) requires earthing of each pole and metallic fittings
attached thereto. In the scheme continuous earth wire was not
provided, instead each pole and attached metallic fittings
were earthed individually. The earth wire used was 8 or 6
SWG, GI wire. Contact of the earth wire with the metallic
fittings was usually not ensured. Frequently, it was not found
in proper contact with cross-arm. In some villages, earth
wires were starting from the cross-arm, leaving the F-clamp
unearthed. Wires embedded in PCC poles were also used for
earthing. For it, two pieces of GI wires were used for
connecting the metallic fittings to the top hook of the pole
and other for connecting the bottom hook to the earth
electrode. However, continuity of the earthing was always
questionable as contact of the GI wires with the hooks was
not properly made and also that of the embedded wire could
not be ensured.
At double-poles, the earth wires used were not in contact with
the TPMO channels, cross-bracings and the TPMO handle.
Few agencies used the wires embedded in PCC poles for
earthing of double poles also, thus leaving the cross-bracings
and TPMO handle unearthed.
6) Indiscriminate use of stays:
Contractors used the stays very indiscriminately. Profit in it
made them to do so. Use of 3-4 stays for single poles and 6
stays at double poles was much frequent. Most of these stays
were unnecessary as rarely any stay in a village was found
tight. In some cases, even their proper direction was not
ensured. Thus, providing large number of stays without
bearing any tension and in inappropriate direction was of no
use.
7) Improper height of TPMO handle:
At sectionaliser double poles, no effort was made to ensure
proper height of the TPMO handle. Usually, it was found
fitted at low height, varying from 1ʹ to 5ʹ. It was not suitable
for proper operation of the handle.
8) Improper mounting of surge arresters:
In the scheme, surge arresters were provided at each substation.
Suitable position of mounting them is as close as
possible to conductors of the overhead line. As per the REC
construction standards F-13 and F-19, also approved by the
Electrical Safety Directorate of Government of Uttar Pradesh,
the surge arresters were to be placed just below the fuse set,
on a separate channel. However, later they were clamped on
the transformer’s body or on its HT bushings. Resistance of
these surge arresters becomes negligible at high voltages. In
the first case, on the arrival of surge or lightning stroke, if a
surge arrester breaks and its clamp comes in contact with the
earth wire, a path parallel to the earthing conductor, through
transformer’s body, is created. Resistances of both paths are
comparable and that of the alternative path is expected to be
lower. Thus, instead of protecting the transformer from a
surge or lightning stroke, surge arresters mounted so make it
more prone to these strokes. In the second case, in a case of
breakage of a surge arrester, the HT bushing of the
transformer may get damaged. Clearly, the agencies had
violated the approved drawing and had mounted the surge
arresters in a position which was technically not suitable.
9) Limited use of longer supports:
Generally, the working agencies employed 8.5 metre PCC
poles for construction of overhead lines. They avoided use of
longer poles. With these PCC poles, it was difficult to ensure
safe clearance from the ground, houses, structures and other
overhead lines. These agencies used extension channels
clamped on the PCC poles, for the purpose. These channels
increase the height but obviously their reliability is poor as
compared with that of a support of longer length.
16th NATIONAL POWER SYSTEMS CONFERENCE, 15th-17th DECEMBER, 2010 569
Department of Electrical Engineering, Univ. College of Engg., Osmania University, Hyderabad, A.P, INDIA.
10) Unsafe clearance of overhead lines from buildings:
Rule 80 provides that where an 11 kV overhead line passes
above or adjacent to any building or part of a building, it shall
have on the basis of maximum sag a vertical clearance above
the highest part of the building immediately under such line,
of not less than 3.7 metres. The horizontal clearance between
the nearest conductor and any part of such building shall on
the basis of maximum deflection due to wind pressure, be not
less than 1.2 metres. However, no consideration was given to
ensure these minimum clearances, in the villages electrified
during the initial phase of the scheme. A large number of
such cases were resulted due to constructions / alterations
made after the erection of overhead lines. In the villages,
people started constructions / alterations to save their plots
from being used for construction of overhead lines because
their objections were not properly addressed by the
contractors / working agencies. Attempt to ensure proper
clearances, started only when it was brought into notice by
the electrical inspectors. As a result, in the villages, these
clearances were ensured by diverting the routes, dismantling
the lines, using vertical extensions or cantilevers, inserting
new poles in the lines, using disc insulators or by removing a
conductor from the lines. Due to the consideration made in
this regard, such cases were few in the villages covered later
in the sceme.
11) Unsafe clearance above ground of the lowest conductor:
As per rule 77, conductor of an 11 kV overhead line or any
part thereof shall not be at a height less than
(a) if erected across a street 6.1 metre
(b) if erected along a street 5.8 metre
© if erected elsewhere than along 4.6 metre
or across any street
At some places, conductors of overhead lines were found at
lower height than the above thus making them unsafe. Most
of these resulted due to the constructions/ alterations made
after the erection of overhead lines. Procedure to be adopted
for erection of or alteration to buildings, structures, flood
banks and elevation of roads, etc. is laid down in rule 82. It
ensures safe clearance above ground of the lowest conductor
of the overhead line during and after completion of such
work. But, there was no coordination between the working
agencies of RGGVY and those involved in civil works such as
construction of roads, culverts, elevation of roads or flood
banks, etc. As a result, ensuring the safe clearance above
ground, of the lowest conductor of the overhead lines is
neglected.
In cases, taken into notice at the time of inspection, the said
clearance was ensured by inserting new poles in overhead
lines, relocating the existing poles, using extensions on poles
or by dismantling the overhead line.
12) Unsafe clearance of the lines from existing overhead lines at crossings:
As per rule 87, where an overhead line crosses or in
proximity to another overhead line, guarding arrangements
shall be provided so as to guard against the possibility of their
coming into contact with each other. Where an 11 kV
overhead line crosses another overhead line clearances shall
be as given in Table 3.1
It is also required that where two overhead lines cross, the
crossing shall be made as nearly at right angles as the nature
of the case admits and as near the support of the line as
practicable and support of the lower line shall not be erected
below the upper line. In other words, overhead line shall not
be constructed above the supports of the existing line.
TABLE 3.1: OVERHEAD LINE CLEARANCES
Voltage category Minimum value (m)
Up to 66 kV
110 kV
132 kV
220 kV
2.44
2.75
3.05
4.58
The existing lines of the distribution companies have no
uniformity. Supports used in them are of different types and
are of varying height. Metallic rail, joist and tubular poles,
latticed steel structures, PCC poles and wooden poles are in
use. Even broken poles, poles with damaged cross-arm and
poles without cross-arm are being used. As a result,
conductors of existing lines have varying clearance from the
ground. To make a proper crossing of these existing lines,
i.e., to ensure the required ground clearance and to maintain
the minimum safe clearance between the conductors of the
two overhead lines, with 8.5 metre PCC poles only was quite
difficult. Thus, at such crossings vertical extensions were
employed to raise the height of the supports. At few places,
where conductors of the existing higher voltage overhead line
had less clearance from the ground, crossing of the higher
voltage line by 11kV overhead line from above was accepted.
Violation of the said rule was observed as follows:
(a) Clearance between the conductors of two overhead
lines was less than the safe one.
(b) Guarding between the overhead lines, to guard against
the possibility of their coming into contact with each
other, was found improper.
© Clearance between the guarding and the conductors
was found improper.
(d) Attempts were not made to make the crossings at right
angles.
(e) No attempt was made to make the crossings near the
support of the line.
(f) Overhead lines were constructed above the supports of
existing low voltage (230 V, single phase), medium
voltage (400 V, 3-phase), high voltage (11 kV) and
defunct telephone lines. Supports were also erected
under the existing higher voltage overhead lines. In
Basti district, during erection of 9.00 metre PCC pole
for 33 kV line, below the 132 kV overhead line, the
pole fell on the conductor of the line. Fortunately no
casualties occurred. The incident could have been
avoided if the crossing was made near the support of
the 132 kV line and the poles were erected far from the
overhead line.
16th NATIONAL POWER SYSTEMS CONFERENCE, 15th-17th DECEMBER, 2010 570
Department of Electrical Engineering, Univ. College of Engg., Osmania University, Hyderabad, A.P, INDIA.
(g) In few villages, stays of the newly constructed 11 kV
overhead lines were found in contact with the
conductor of the existing low or medium voltage lines.
13) Excessive joints in conductors:
Rule 75 requires that joints between conductors of overhead
lines shall be mechanically and electrically secure under the
conditions of operation. The ultimate strength of the joint
shall not be less than 95% of that of the conductor and the
electrical conductivity not less than that of the conductor. As
per proviso to the rule, no conductor of an overhead line shall
have more than two joints in a span. Though rare but
conductors having more than two joints in a span were found.
14) Improper Jumpers and connecting/terminating leads:
In the installations constructed under the RGGVY scheme,
jumpers and connecting/terminating leads were found
violating the recommendations made under section 11 [2] as
follows:
(a) None of the working agencies employed PG clamps for
proper jumpering. They relied on hand made joints. Most
of these, improperly made joints, become hot-spots during
normal operating conditions and as a result these jumpers
get burnt frequently.
(b)Minimum clearance of 0.3 metre was not maintained
between jumpers or connecting/ terminating leads and
non- current carrying metallic parts such as cross arm,
guarding, channels, etc. Especially at sectionaliser double
poles, they were found at unsafe distances mainly from the
stays and guarding.
© At pole mounted 10 or 16 kVA sub-stations, leads
terminating at the transformer or surge arresters were of 1
to 3 strands of conductor. Insisting continuously, most of
these were replaced later by complete conductor.
(d) Pin insulators were used in inverted vertical or in
horizontal position for fixing the jumpers and connecting/
terminating leads. These insulators are not meant for use
in such positions, as the inside of rain-shades is exposed.
15) Use of inappropriate insulators:
Use of appropriate insulators, in overhead lines, is
recommended in Section 8.2 [2]. It was found violated in the
construction of the 11 kV overhead lines, as follows:
(a) Single cross-arm with pin insulators was used at pole
positions having a bend up to 90o,
(b) A set of pin with a set of disc insulators was employed
at pole positions having a bend of 90o,
© When asked to use double cross-arms, with pin
insulators, for bend of 10o to 30o, one of the agencies
used double cross-arms fitted back to back, making the
addition of another cross-arm useless,
(d) Single cross-arms with pin insulators were found
employed at dead ends of lines.
16) Improper guarding:
If a live conductor of an overhead line breaks and falls on the
ground the circuit fuse will blow or the circuit breaker will
trip to render the line electrically harmless. But in practice it
may not happen due to the high resistance involved in the
circuit. In order to ensure the blowing off of a fuse or tripping
of a circuit breaker, protective guarding is provided to the
conductors of an overhead line. Rule 91 requires such
guarding for every overhead line erected over any part of
street or other public place or in any factory or mine or on any
consumer’s premises. In addition an Inspector may by notice
in writing require the owner of any such overhead line
wherever it may be erected to provide protective guarding.
In RGGVY, the working agencies were not doing the
guarding willingly. They felt it as a burden unnecessarily
imposed over them. They were neither doing it as per the
agreement nor as asked by the Inspector. Instead they made
all excuses to avoid it.
Regarding the guarding of conductors of an overhead line, the
provisions are as follows: